In discussions of Turkey's eligibility for membership in the Union, culture appears and reappears as an important point of contention. The question I wish to raise in my brief talk is this: What kind of culture is the standard for judging any nation-state in Europe for membership eligibility in the Union? Or, to put the same question somewhat differently: What is the nature of the culture that modern Europe nation-states have in common that serves as criterion for admission to the EU?
Just recently, in an article that was published by the Financial Times, M. Valery Giscard d'Estaing, among other objections to Turkey's accession to the EU, mentioned the cultural and historical legacy of Turkey as an obstacle. He prefaced his remarks by saying something something to the effect that: "As long as European citizens cannot think of themselves as having a single, shared identity, European patriotism cannot come into existence." His point was that given Turkey's historical and cultural background, the citizens of the Republic of Turkey cannot share that single European identity and hence do not qualify to be European citizens. This, of course, raises the question of what it is that the citizens of the European nation-states share that constitutes their common identity.
Let us label M d'Estaing's remarks as the "d'Estaing Syndrome" signifying opposition to Turkey's membership in the EU at the cultural level voiced by some within the Union. I suggest that the Syndrome conflates and confuses two separate kinds of culture and hence two types of identity: (1) a pre-political conception of culture anchored in the ascriptive aspects of one's identity and collective unity based on common descent, religion, race, ethnicity etc. and (2) a political conception of culture centered on the civic aspect of one's identity and collective unity based on citizenship. In his remarks about Turkey, M. d'Estaing conflates the two kinds of culture, and attempts to anchor the European-wide identity that European citizens share at both the ascriptive and civic levels of culture. Among other things, he mentions not only the philosophy of the Enlightenment, rationalism and scientific thinking as the bases of European identity, but also the dominant religion, obviously in reference to Christianity.
I would like to suggest that, in fact, in the construction of modern Europe, ascriptive culture has been the problem and civic culture the solution. In other words, what is common to the modern Europe of nation-states is precisely a civic culture embedded in a secular, democratic and constitutional concept of citizenship equipped with individual rights and responsibilities. This is the achievement of the European nation-states against the background of a painful history of wars, massacres, and expulsions that were inflamed by differences of religion, sect, race and ethnicity. Whereas ascriptive cultures divide Europe, it is the achievement of civic culture that unites them.
As it has been pointed out by Jürgen Habermas, the challenge before the European Union is not to invent anything new but to conserve and build upon the democratic achievements of the European nation-state. These achievements underlie what we may call the "European way of life", a form of life that is based on a civic culture of democratic, secular citizenship bound by the rule of law, resting on active participation and deliberation, and equipped with individual rights and responsibilities, as well as levels of social welfare, education and leisure that are the prerequisites of both private autonomy and democratic citizenship. The European Union, in other words, is neither a mere market nor a primordial-cultural unity but a political union that shares a civic democratic culture. It is upon this achievement that the European Union is constructed, and again it is upon this that a possible Europe of citizens will be built based upon a common constitution, a European-wide civil society, and a common public sphere of participation and communication and a shared political culture.
The pride of modern Europe derives from its commitment and capacity to overcome the deep conflicts and confrontations of the darker side of its history, to learn from those painful and deadly struggles and to be able to cope with deep cleavages, schisms and rivalries stemming from ascriptive differences of sect, religion, ethnicity and race. In other words, the common European bond is the culture of reconciliation and the politics of inclusion based on a civic understanding of political community. It is this civic solidarity that provides the tie that binds modern Europe. The emergence of civic consciousness and democratic identity involved the painful process of transition from local and dynastic identities to the pluralization of ascriptive loyalties under the common roof of allegiance to an overarching civic polity. The European Union as a project is based on the assumption that such solidarity can be extended beyond the borders of classical nation-states, to embrace modern Europe as the nation of citizens. The European Union is based on the premise of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-lingual society that is united by its commitment to a civic, secular community of democratic citizens.
The point I am trying to make is this: Turkey as a potential member needs to be judged, not by the criterion of ascriptive culture, but by civic standards and by its commitment to the same democratic culture practiced by other members of the EU. In short, Turkey, or any other potential member, needs to be judged by its achievements. The way in which history plays a role in judging Turkey for membership is whether the Republic of Turkey has learned from its past just as much as the nation-states of Europe have? Has it established a civic culture of reconciliation and a politics of inclusion as the solution to its equally painful history of conflicts and confrontations? Moreover, has Turkey reflexively appropriated from its history values and norms that facilitate the construction of such a democratic culture? In short, is Turkey a consolidated nation of citizens, a stable civic polity, and functioning secular democracy based on the rule of law and individual rights? Does Turkey share with the rest of Europe a way of life based on such values and practices?
In arriving at democratic society, the different nation-states of the European Union have not necessarily traveled an identical route. Each in its own way, and with varying degrees of timing and success, has nevertheless achieved the minimum standards of a functioning political society committed to democratic and civic values. Starting from divergent points of origin, the nation states of Europe have converged in their commitment and practice of democracy despite their varied histories and ancestral cultures.
The relevant question, therefore, is: Can the same be said of Turkey? Starting in mid-19th century, Turkey has persistently pursued its commitment to a civic culture. The establishment of a constitutional, parliamentary government, the shift to a community of citizens, the founding of the republican nation state resting on secularism, rule of law and territorial citizenship, and finally the transition to democracy in 1950—surely, none were free of conflict and painful confrontations. Neither was democracy accident-free after 1950, but the commitment has persisted, and the Turkish leadership and citizens have not given up on their aspirations to make democracy "the only game in town".
I believe the paradigm shift to a democratic culture of reconciliation and the politics of inclusion has taken place in Turkey. Clearly, all problems have not been solved but the leadership and citizens of Turkey are committed to resolving their problems and differences within a democratic framework. Islam in Turkey is no longer the opponent of secular democracy but its friend. It has, I believe, adapted itself to the logic of democratic institutions and practices. Important steps have been taken toward accommodating sectarian and ethnic differences within the framework of civic solidarity and democratic citizenship. Fundamental measures have been taken to upgrade individual rights. I don't intend to judge here whether the Republic of Turkey has lived up to the minimum of standards that makes it eligible for the process of membership. I wish only to point out the confusion that surrounds the concept of culture when it is applied particularly to the case of Turkey.
M. d'Estaing and those who think like him are unfair to Turkey only insofar as they betray the very values, norms and standards that are rightly a source of pride for Europe. It is not so much their underestimation of the achievements of Turkey that is troublesome but their underestimation of Europe's achievements. No one can ask the members of the European Union to spare Turkey: the rules, norms and standards of a democratic Europe need to be applied, and applied strictly. But let us use the relevant standards; let us apply the cultural standards that make modern Europe what it is: a people committed to building unity out of diversity, a people committed to resolving their differences democratically, and a people that aspire to capitalize on the achievements of the nation-state to construct a cooperative venture beyond the nation state. Let me end with the words of one the best minds contemporary Europe has produced. As Jürgen Habermas has pointed out, a Europe of citizens will be built when differentiation occurs "between a common political culture and the branching of national traditions of art and literature, historiography, philosophy etc." A Europe of citizens will be built when the same universalist rights and constitutional principles "enjoy pride of place in the context of different national histories, and when a common politicocultural self-image will stand out against the cultural orientations of different nationalities."
Citizens of Turkey have been committed to building a common political culture with the rest of Europe for the past 150 years. Let us therefore judge Turkey by the universalist rights and constitutional principles of such a commitment.
